The proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) is one of the most ambitious and controversial elements of the international plan for Gaza.
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It is intended to help create the security conditions for a transition from wartime control towards Palestinian civilian administration, while supporting a ceasefire, protecting civilians and humanitarian operations, and assisting with the removal of military infrastructure and weapons.
On paper, the concept sounds straightforward: an international force enters Gaza, helps maintain order, supports the transition to Palestinian governance and eventually withdraws.
In reality, almost every part of that plan raises difficult questions.
Who will command the force? Which countries will send troops? What happens if armed groups refuse to disarm? How will international troops distinguish between peacekeeping and combat? And perhaps most importantly, can a foreign military force establish stability without becoming another party to the conflict?
The answers could determine whether the ISF becomes a successful transitional peacekeeping operation—or finds itself caught in a new and potentially dangerous phase of the Gaza conflict.
What Is the International Stabilisation Force?
The International Stabilisation Force is a proposed multinational security operation intended to operate in Gaza during the transition following the war.
Its legal foundation comes from United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted in November 2025.
Rather than being a conventional United Nations peacekeeping mission, the ISF is a UN-authorised multinational force operating within the wider international framework established for Gaza.
Its purpose is broadly to provide the security environment needed for the territory to move towards civilian Palestinian administration.
The mission is expected to include several interconnected responsibilities:
- Supporting the ceasefire
- Helping maintain security
- Protecting civilians
- Supporting humanitarian operations
- Assisting with the training and deployment of Palestinian police
- Helping secure areas from which Israeli forces withdraw
- Supporting the removal of weapons and military infrastructure
- Preventing armed groups from rebuilding military capabilities
- Assisting the transition towards Palestinian civilian governance
The force therefore occupies an unusual position.
It is neither intended to become Gaza's permanent government nor to replace Palestinian security institutions indefinitely.
Instead, it is supposed to act as a temporary bridge between war and political reconstruction.
That sounds simple.
The reality is anything but.
Why Is an International Force Needed?
The fundamental problem is the security vacuum that could emerge during an Israeli withdrawal.
Gaza has been devastated by prolonged warfare, while Hamas and other armed groups have maintained military capabilities despite enormous losses.
Simply removing one military force from an area does not automatically create peace.
There must be someone capable of maintaining order.
Without an effective security structure, several possibilities could emerge:
- Armed factions could compete for territory.
- Criminal organisations could exploit the vacuum.
- Weapons could circulate freely.
- Humanitarian supplies could be intercepted.
- Local disputes could escalate into violence.
- Hamas or other armed groups could attempt to rebuild.
- Israeli forces could be drawn back into Gaza.
The ISF is intended to prevent this scenario.
Its existence is therefore tied directly to the wider political objective of establishing a new system of governance.
A Force Between Two Worlds
The ISF faces an extraordinary challenge because it is supposed to operate between several competing interests.
Israel wants security guarantees and the removal of Hamas's military capabilities.
Palestinians want an end to Israeli military control and a credible path towards self-government.
Hamas has historically rejected demands that would require it to surrender its military capabilities without substantial political guarantees.
International governments want stability without becoming permanently responsible for Gaza. Humanitarian organisations need safe access to civilians. The proposed Palestinian administration needs sufficient security to function.
The ISF therefore sits at the intersection of all these interests.
If it satisfies one side too strongly, it risks losing the confidence of another.
Who Will Command the Force?
The proposed force has been placed under a unified command structure. Major General Jasper Jeffers has been appointed as its commander.
The command arrangement is unusual because the force has been authorised by the UN but is not simply another traditional UN peacekeeping mission.
This distinction is important.
Traditional UN peacekeeping operations generally operate within established United Nations structures and have developed procedures concerning mandates, command, rules of engagement and the use of force.
The ISF is being created through the much broader Gaza transition framework and is linked to the Board of Peace, the international body established to oversee implementation of the plan.
The result is a hybrid arrangement:
international legitimacy through the UN, but an operational structure centred outside the traditional UN peacekeeping system.
Which Countries Are Providing Troops?
Building an international force requires countries willing to put their own soldiers into an extraordinarily dangerous environment.
Among the countries identified as founding contributors are:
- Albania
- Indonesia
- Kazakhstan
- Kosovo
- Morocco
- Uganda
Other governments have also been approached regarding participation.
However, attracting troops has proved difficult. This is understandable. Governments considering participation must answer an uncomfortable question:
What exactly are their soldiers being asked to do?
If the ISF simply monitors a ceasefire and protects humanitarian operations, the risks may be manageable.
If it has to confront armed groups and forcibly confiscate weapons, the mission becomes dramatically more dangerous.
The difference between those two scenarios could determine whether governments are willing to participate at all.
The Disarmament Problem
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the ISF is the proposed disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups.
The international plan ultimately envisages Gaza becoming demilitarised.
That means weapons and military infrastructure must be removed or decommissioned.
But there is a fundamental difference between voluntary disarmament and forced disarmament.
If Hamas and other factions agree to surrender their weapons, the ISF could help supervise the process.
If they refuse, international troops could find themselves being asked to enforce it.
That could mean searches, seizures, arrests and potentially armed confrontation.
At that point, the ISF would no longer simply be keeping the peace. It would be 'enforcing' the peace.
And enforcement can look remarkably similar to warfare.
What Happens If the ISF Is Attacked?
This is one of the most important unanswered questions surrounding the mission.
Imagine international soldiers establishing a security checkpoint.
An armed group attacks them.
What happens next?
Are the soldiers authorised to pursue the attackers? Can they enter buildings? Can they arrest suspected militants?
Can they use lethal force? And can they respond with heavy weapons?
The answers must be established through detailed rules of engagement.
If the rules are too restrictive, the force could become ineffective. If they are too aggressive, it could become perceived simply as another occupying military force.
The Israeli Withdrawal Question
The ISF is closely connected to the planned Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
The underlying concept is that Israeli forces would progressively withdraw as security conditions improve.
International troops would then help maintain order in areas handed over to the new security arrangement.
But the timing of withdrawal remains politically contentious.
Israel has repeatedly emphasised that Hamas cannot be allowed to retain military capabilities.
That creates a sequencing problem.
Should Israel withdraw first?
Should Hamas disarm first?
Should both processes happen simultaneously?
Or should international forces enter first and provide the security guarantee allowing the two sides to disengage?
Every option carries serious risks.
If Israel withdraws before Hamas is disarmed, Israel fears that Hamas could rebuild.
If Israel remains until Hamas is disarmed, the international transition could struggle to begin.
If the ISF is expected to enforce disarmament itself, its troops could become directly involved in fighting.
This is the central dilemma.
A foreign military presence can provide temporary stability. It cannot realistically govern a territory indefinitely.
For the transition to succeed, Palestinians themselves ultimately need to possess functioning institutions capable of maintaining law and order.
The ISF therefore has a built-in expiration date.
The Danger of Becoming an Occupying Force
One of the greatest political dangers is perception. Even if the ISF enters Gaza with an international mandate and the intention of facilitating Palestinian self-government, Palestinians may judge the force according to what it actually does.
If international troops are seen protecting civilians and helping rebuild institutions, they may gain legitimacy.
If they are seen conducting raids, detaining Palestinians or forcibly removing weapons, the perception could change dramatically.
The force could begin to look less like a peacekeeping operation and more like another military authority.
That would undermine one of the most important objectives:
creating the conditions for Palestinian political legitimacy.
The Problem of Neutrality
A peacekeeping force must be trusted—or at least tolerated—by the parties among whom it operates.
The ISF faces an especially difficult neutrality problem. It will have to coordinate with Israel. It will have to deal with Palestinian authorities. It may have to confront armed Palestinian factions.
And it will have a command structure closely associated with the United States.
Why Darkness Surrounds the Mission
There is an unusual paradox at the heart of the ISF.
The mission is intended to create clarity and stability.Yet much of its future depends upon conditions that remain uncertain.
Nobody can know with any confidence:
- How many troops will ultimately be deployed
- How many countries will participate
- How quickly Israeli forces will withdraw
- Whether Hamas will disarm
- How other armed factions will respond
- How effective Palestinian security institutions will become
- How long the international force will be required
- What will happen if international troops suffer casualties
These uncertainties make the ISF less like a conventional military deployment and more like an enormous experiment in conflict management, or even Black Ops.
The problem is that temporary international forces have a tendency to become entangled in the political realities they were created to manage.
The longer soldiers remain, the more responsibilities can accumulate.
What Could Go Wrong?
There are clearly several obvious failure scenarios:
- Hamas refuses to disarm
- Israel refuses to withdraw
- International troops suffer unnecessary casualties
- The force could become viewed as another foreign authority
- Armed factions attack the ISF
The mission could rapidly escalate from peacekeeping to more combat.
There are reasons for cautious optimism.
International peacekeeping and stabilisation missions have sometimes helped create breathing space after devastating conflicts.
But there is no guarantee.
The ISF is attempting to solve several problems simultaneously:
security, disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian governance, humanitarian access and reconstruction.
Any one of these would be difficult.
Attempting to address all of them at once makes the mission exceptionally ambitious.
How do we know they are truly 'neutral'?
“Neutral” is one of the most important—and most questionable—claims surrounding the International Stabilisation Force.
The ISF has an international mandate, but that does not automatically make it politically neutral.
There are several legitimate reasons to question how neutral it can realistically be.
The first problem: who created the framework?
The ISF exists within a US-backed Gaza plan and the Board of Peace, rather than being a conventional UN peacekeeping operation. The Security Council authorised it in Resolution 2803, but the resolution gives the Board of Peace strategic oversight and allows the force to operate under a unified command acceptable to that body.
That matters because internationally authorised is not synonymous with independent or neutral.
The United States is the principal political force behind the wider arrangement. And they are currently at war with Iran from their own choosing.
President Trump also chairs his own self-proclaimed 'Board of Peace', and the force is being developed within that US-led framework.
Critics have consequently questioned whether the ISF can genuinely act independently of American and Israeli strategic interests.
And look at what the force has actually been mandated to do. This is perhaps the strongest argument. The ISF isn't merely being asked to stand between two armies and observe a ceasefire.
Its mandate includes helping to:
- demilitarise Gaza
- destroy military and offensive infrastructure
- permanently decommission weapons belonging to non-state armed groups
- prevent military infrastructure from being rebuilt
- secure border areas
- train Palestinian police
- monitor the ceasefire
The resolution even authorises the force to use “all necessary measures” to carry out its mandate, consistent with international law.
That creates an obvious question:
If Hamas refuses to disarm, whose side is the ISF on when it attempts to take those weapons?
From the perspective of Hamas, it could look like an international force enforcing Israeli and American security objectives.
From Israel's perspective, the same force could be criticised for being insufficiently aggressive if it doesn't eliminate Hamas's military capabilities.
That is an extremely difficult position for a supposedly neutral force.
There is another major issue: Israel and the ISF are supposed to cooperate
Resolution 2803 explicitly says the ISF will work with Israel and Egypt, as well as Palestinian police, and that Israeli military withdrawal will be linked to progress on demilitarisation.
That doesn't prove that the ISF is biased.
But it does create a structural question about neutrality.
Imagine the force is monitoring an area where Israeli forces are still present and an incident occurs.
The ISF has to determine whether an Israeli unit, Palestinian armed group or civilian was responsible.
Its personnel then have to coordinate with Israel while simultaneously being responsible for protecting Palestinian civilians and overseeing the demilitarisation process.
Can an organisation be genuinely impartial while being operationally dependent upon one of the parties to the conflict?
That is one of the questions worth watching.
The Board of Peace itself is controversial
This is arguably even more important than the ISF.
The Board of Peace is not a conventional international institution with decades of established procedures and a broad membership comparable to the United Nations.
It is a US-created political framework chaired by Trump.
Reuters has reported criticism that the structure resembles a colonial-style arrangement and that Palestinian representation has been insufficient. It has also noted that major powers including China, Russia and India have declined to join.
That produces an interesting chain:
US-backed peace plan
↓
Board of Peace
↓
International Stabilisation Force
↓
Demilitarisation of Gaza
↓
Palestinian police and transitional administration
So the question isn't simply whether the individual soldiers are neutral.
It's whether the institutional structure above them is neutral.
The mandate itself isn't politically symmetrical
This is probably the most uncomfortable issue.
The ISF has an explicit responsibility to ensure Gaza is demilitarised and to permanently decommission weapons belonging to non-state armed groups.
But Israel is also a military actor in the conflict.
The current arrangement envisages Israeli withdrawal being linked to Palestinian demilitarisation.
That creates an asymmetry:
Palestinian armed groups are required to surrender military capabilities first.
Israel is then required to withdraw from Gaza under specified conditions.
Those are not equivalent actions.
And critics can reasonably ask whether the international force is primarily being created to enforce Palestinian disarmament and facilitate Israeli withdrawal, rather than to impose equally stringent security obligations on all parties.
That doesn't necessarily mean the arrangement is wrong. But it does mean the word “neutral” deserves scrutiny.
There are also concerns from potential troop-contributing countries
This isn't merely a criticism coming from Hamas or Palestinian political factions.
Countries considering participation have their own concerns.
In May, reports indicated that the force was struggling to obtain meaningful troop contributions despite several countries having pledged personnel. The difficulties reflected the danger of the mission and uncertainty over precisely what troops would be expected to do.
That uncertainty is important.
A country might be happy to send soldiers to:
- monitor a ceasefire and protect humanitarian workers
It may be considerably less enthusiastic about sending them to:
- forcibly disarm an armed organisation
The second is much closer to a combat mission.
Indonesia is an interesting example
Indonesia's proposed participation illustrates the diplomatic problem particularly well.
Indonesia has traditionally tried to maintain an independent foreign policy and has strongly supported Palestinian rights.
Yet it has also become involved in the US-led Gaza framework and discussed deploying thousands of troops.
Analysts have warned that participation could potentially damage Indonesia's reputation for diplomatic independence.
That doesn't mean Indonesian troops would automatically be biased.
Quite the opposite: Indonesia's involvement could actually give the ISF greater credibility among Muslim-majority countries.
But it demonstrates just how politically complicated the word “neutral” becomes.
So, how do we know they are neutral?
We don't—not yet.
And that's probably the most accurate answer.
Neutrality isn't something that can be established simply by putting several different national flags on a force.
It has to be demonstrated through behaviour.
We would need to see whether the ISF:
1. Applies its rules consistently
If Palestinian fighters are disarmed but Israeli violations are ignored, neutrality would become questionable.
2. Investigates incidents independently
If an international investigation finds wrongdoing regardless of which side committed it, confidence increases.
3. Protects Palestinian civilians
Not merely Israeli security interests.
4. Protects Israeli civilians
Not merely Palestinian interests.
5. Enforces its mandate consistently
Including when doing so is politically inconvenient.
6. Maintains independent rules of engagement
Rather than effectively becoming an extension of another country's military.
7. Reports transparently
Casualties, arrests, weapons seizures, investigations and alleged violations should ideally be independently documented.
8. Has meaningful Palestinian participation
A force imposed entirely from outside is inherently more difficult to portray as politically neutral.
And there's another fascinating contradiction
The ISF is supposed to be neutral enough to be trusted by Palestinians.
But it is also supposed to be strong enough to disarm Palestinian armed groups.
Those two objectives can collide.
Suppose an ISF unit enters a neighbourhood to confiscate weapons.
The force says:
"We are enforcing the internationally agreed demilitarisation process."
The armed group says:
"You are enforcing an American-Israeli agenda."
The ISF responds:
"We have a UN Security Council mandate."
Both statements could simultaneously be true.
That is what makes this so complicated.
Legal legitimacy does not necessarily produce political legitimacy.
Who gets to decide what neutrality means?
Israel may define neutrality as preventing Hamas from ever becoming a military threat again.
Hamas may define neutrality as preventing Israel from maintaining military control over Gaza.
Palestinian civilians may define neutrality as protecting them from all armed actors.
The United States may define neutrality as implementing the agreed peace framework.
Those definitions don't necessarily coincide.
So the ISF enters Gaza carrying something much more complicated than weapons and equipment.
It carries a political mandate.
Whether that mandate ultimately looks neutral will depend far less on what the force calls itself than on whose interests its soldiers are perceived to protect, whose actions they are willing to restrain, and what happens when the interests of Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian administration and the international force collide.
And that is arguably the central unresolved controversy surrounding the entire project.
The Big Questions
Ultimately, the fate of the International Stabilisation Force depends upon fundamental issues:
- Is the ISF truly neutral?
- Can Gaza be made secure without the international force becoming another combatant?
If Hamas and other armed factions voluntarily disarm, Israeli forces withdraw, Palestinian police become capable of maintaining order and reconstruction progresses, the ISF could perform exactly the role for which it was designed.
It could become a temporary bridge between war and peace.
But if disarmament becomes a military confrontation, the entire character of the mission could change. International troops could suddenly find themselves fighting in the same devastated territory they were supposed to help stabilise.
That would place enormous pressure on the countries contributing personnel and could fundamentally alter the political legitimacy of the operation.
The Experiment Begins
The International Stabilisation Force represents an extraordinary gamble.
It attempts to insert an international security mechanism into one of the world's most politically sensitive conflicts and use it to facilitate a transition towards Palestinian civilian government.
Its supporters see it as necessary.
Its critics fear it could become an occupation by another name—or be dragged into a conflict it was never designed to fight.
The truth will ultimately be determined not by the wording of its mandate but by what happens on the ground.
If the guns fall silent, weapons are surrendered, Israeli forces withdraw and Palestinian institutions take root, the ISF may eventually disappear almost unnoticed.
If the 'peace' collapses, however, its soldiers could find themselves at the centre of a new conflict. And that is what makes the International Stabilisation Force a consequential experiment in modern international security:
it has supposedly been created to prevent the next war—but its greatest test may come if preventing that war requires it to fight. And if it does fight, whose side is it actually on...?
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