Social-Media Accounts and Networks You Should Treat With Caution
Social media has made it possible for almost anyone to publish something that looks like news.
A profile can have a blue tick, a professional-looking logo and thousands of followers. It can call itself News, Press, TV or Monitor. It can repost the same story dozens of times until it appears to be everywhere.
But appearance is not evidence.
There is documented evidence of US-linked information operations and pro-Western coordinated activity, including operations that used deceptive social-media personas.
For example, Stanford Internet Observatory and Graphika studied networks on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and other platforms that used deceptive tactics to promote pro-Western narratives.
OpenAI reported that the operation generated articles and social-media posts, including political content relating to US elections. It also used apparently ordinary material such as fashion and beauty content, potentially to make the accounts appear more authentic.
Researchers have documented networks in which accounts deliberately disguised themselves as journalists, local citizens or independent news organisations, while coordinating their activity behind the scenes.
Some have been linked to governments or state-backed organisations; others have deliberately obscured who is behind them.
This article provides a research watchlist, rather than claiming that every account listed below is currently active or that every post from a particular organisation is false.
What does “fake news account” actually mean?
The phrase fake news is often used far too loosely. There are at least four different things that can be happening:
Fake identity
> An account pretends to be somebody or something it isn't.
Coordinated inauthentic behaviour
> Multiple accounts work together while attempting to conceal their relationship.
Disinformation
> False or misleading information is deliberately produced or distributed.
Propaganda
> Information is presented selectively or manipulatively to advance a political or ideological objective.
An organisation can therefore produce propaganda without every individual story being false. Conversely, an apparently ordinary account can distribute completely fabricated material without belonging to a major propaganda organisation.
For that reason, this list concentrates on documented operations, networks and accounts that researchers or platforms have specifically identified as deceptive, coordinated or involved in information manipulation.
Who Is Really Controlling the Narrative on Social Media?
Social media was supposed to make information more democratic.
Instead, it has created an environment where governments, political organisations, private companies, activists and anonymous operators can all compete to influence what people believe.
Some publish genuine information. Some publish propaganda. Some deliberately spread false information. And some attempt to disguise who is actually behind the account. We have posted a list of all known accounts below.
The important point is that this is not something done exclusively by Russia, China or Iran.
There is documented evidence of influence operations originating from, or promoting the interests of, the United States and its allies as well.
If we are serious about investigating propaganda, the same standards need to be applied to everyone.
What actually is propaganda?
The word "propaganda" is often used as an insult, but propaganda doesn't necessarily mean that something is completely false. A government can publish something that is factually accurate while still using it as propaganda.
It can select which facts receive attention, which images are repeatedly shown, which witnesses are interviewed and which information is ignored. That can create a particular interpretation of events without requiring the underlying facts to be fabricated.
This makes several terms worth separating.
Misinformation is false information that may be shared without an intention to deceive.
Disinformation is deliberately deceptive or false information.
Propaganda is communication designed to influence attitudes or behaviour.
Coordinated inauthentic behaviour involves accounts working together while concealing who is really behind them.
These categories can overlap, but they are not identical.
America and the West
This is an area that is frequently missing from discussions about online propaganda. In 2022, Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory investigated networks that had been removed by Twitter and Meta.
Their investigation found an interconnected network of accounts operating across Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and other platforms.
The researchers described it as a series of covert campaigns promoting "pro-Western narratives" in the Middle East and Central Asia.
The campaigns promoted the interests of the United States and its allies while criticising countries including Russia, China and Iran.
Some of the activity shared material from US government-funded media organisations such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, as well as websites sponsored by the US military.
The researchers did not establish that all of the covert activity was directly controlled by the US government. But the evidence demonstrates that deceptive social-media activity promoting pro-Western narratives has existed.
It therefore cannot reasonably be argued that online influence operations are simply something America's geopolitical opponents do.
The US military and social media
Meta has also documented a network originating in the United States that it linked to individuals associated with the US military.
The operation used multiple internet services and targeted audiences in countries including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and others.
Meta eventually removed the accounts for violating its rules against coordinated inauthentic behaviour.
This doesn't mean that everything published by the US military is propaganda. Military organisations may have legitimate reasons to communicate with the public.
The important question is whether an organisation is openly communicating as itself or secretly attempting to influence people through apparently independent accounts.
That distinction should apply to every country. No country gets a free pass.
Russia
Russia has a substantial documented history of online influence operations.
Meta has identified Russian networks that used fake accounts, fabricated news organisations and networks of websites designed to resemble legitimate European news outlets.
One operation removed by Meta in 2022 involved more than 60 spoofed websites and targeted audiences in Germany, France, Italy, Ukraine and Britain.
Meta subsequently linked the operation to two Russian companies: Social Design Agency and Structura National Technologies.
These operations demonstrate one particularly effective technique:
Make propaganda look like ordinary journalism.
If a reader doesn't recognise where an article originated, the political message can become detached from its original source.
China
China has also been associated with documented coordinated influence operations.
Meta reported removing a Chinese-origin operation that targeted US domestic politics and Czech political debate.
Researchers have also tracked the "Spamouflage" network, a large-scale operation associated with Chinese state influence.
Graphika reported that Chinese covert influence operations had impersonated human-rights organisations critical of Beijing, apparently attempting to discredit those organisations and interfere with political discussions in Western countries.
Again, the existence of such operations doesn't mean that every Chinese news organisation or Chinese social-media account is propaganda.
Evidence needs to be examined at the level of the specific organisation or network.
Iran
Iran has also been the subject of numerous investigations into online influence operations.
Meta has previously removed Iranian networks that created fake accounts and attempted to mislead people about who was behind them.
Its investigations found Iranian-origin operations targeting audiences across multiple countries.
More recent research has examined networks promoting pro-Iran narratives during conflicts involving Israel and Iran.
Graphika reported that these networks circulated breaking-news claims, threats and unverified information while attempting to shape perceptions of the conflict.
But again, the correct conclusion isn't that everything originating in Iran is propaganda. The evidence applies to particular networks and operations.
Israel
Israel also needs to be included in a genuinely neutral investigation.
In 2024, Meta removed a network associated with an Israeli political influence company, STOIC. The network used fake accounts and promoted pro-Israel material.
Some accounts reportedly presented themselves as Americans and Canadians, including people claiming identities such as students or members of minority communities.
The operation targeted political debate and organisations including UNRWA.
Ukraine
Ukraine presents another complicated example because it is an active participant in a major war.
Governments involved in wars have obvious incentives to influence public opinion. They need to maintain morale, encourage foreign support and undermine the enemy.
That doesn't mean their information is necessarily false. It means that information originating directly from a government or military involved in a conflict should be treated as information from an interested party.
The question should never be:
"Which side do I support?"
It should be:
"What independent evidence exists?"
Britain
Britain isn't outside this problem either. The British government, political parties and military organisations all engage in strategic communications.
Some of this is completely legitimate. Governments have to communicate with citizens. The concern begins when apparently independent voices are actually being coordinated, when identities are concealed, or when political messaging is deliberately presented as spontaneous public opinion.
That is why British information operations deserve investigation too.
Political movements
There is another category that can easily be overlooked. Not every influence operation belongs to a government.
Political movements can use coordinated social-media activity to create the appearance of widespread support.
This can happen on the political right and it can happen on the political left. It can happen around environmental campaigns, immigration, wars, elections, vaccines, economics and virtually any controversial subject.
An account expressing an extreme political opinion isn't automatically fake.
But a group of accounts pretending to be independent ordinary citizens while coordinating their activity is something else.
Commercial fake news
Not all propaganda is political. There is also a large commercial incentive to manufacture sensational information.
Websites and social-media accounts can make money from advertising. That creates an incentive to publish material that generates clicks.
The headline doesn't necessarily need to be true. It needs to be interesting enough to share.
The result can look like an enormous grassroots movement when it is actually being produced by a very small number of people.
The rise of AI-generated identities
One of the most worrying developments is the ability to manufacture apparently real people.
AI can produce realistic profile photographs. It can generate convincing biographies, it can write in different languages, it can respond to other users.
And it can create completely fictional personalities.
Meta reported that more than two-thirds of the coordinated influence operations it disrupted in 2022 contained accounts that appeared to use AI-generated profile photographs.
This creates a major problem for ordinary users. A photograph is no longer reliable evidence that the person behind an account exists.
The most effective propaganda may not be completely false
This is an important point. Propaganda doesn't always require a fabricated story.
Consider a genuine photograph. The photograph is real. The event is real. But the caption is misleading.
Or consider a genuine news report. The report is real. But an important piece of context has been removed.
Or consider a genuine government statistic. The statistic is accurate. But another statistic that contradicts the intended narrative is never mentioned.
In all three cases, the underlying information can be genuine while the overall message is misleading.
The information laundering problem
A story can also travel through several apparently independent sources.
For example:
Government statement
↓
Political organisation
↓
Website
↓
Social-media account
↓
Influencer
↓
Thousands of reposts
↓
Your news feed
By the time the story reaches you, the original source may be almost invisible.
You might therefore believe that thousands of independent people have reached the same conclusion.
They may not have. They may simply be repeating the same original information.
A blue tick doesn't prove anything
Social-media verification is another problem.
A verified account can look authoritative. But verification does not necessarily establish that the information being published is accurate.
Nor does a large number of followers prove that an account is trustworthy. An account can become popular because it publishes information that people want to believe.
Popularity and accuracy are two different things.
How to investigate a suspicious account
Before accepting an important claim, ask five questions.
1. Who owns the account?
Can you identify a real person or organisation?
2. Who funds it?
Is there government, corporate, political or private funding?
3. Where did the story originate?
Trace it backwards.
4. Are the sources genuinely independent?
Ten accounts repeating the same story may actually represent one source.
5. Who benefits?
If you believe the story, who gains politically, financially or strategically?
These questions don't tell you whether something is true.
They tell you where to investigate next.
This is the principle that should underpin any serious investigation of online propaganda.
Russia doesn't get a free pass.
China doesn't get a free pass.
Iran doesn't get a free pass.
Israel doesn't get a free pass.
Ukraine doesn't get a free pass.
America doesn't get a free pass.
Britain doesn't get a free pass.
Political parties don't get a free pass.
And neither do alternative-media organisations simply because they claim to be exposing the mainstream media.
The same evidential standard should apply to everybody.
The uncomfortable possibility
Perhaps the biggest danger isn't that one side manages to convince everybody. It may be that nobody knows what to believe anymore.
If people encounter hundreds of competing claims every day, they can eventually reach the conclusion that: "Everyone lies."
That can be useful to propagandists too.
Because if nobody trusts anything, establishing the truth becomes almost impossible.
The objective doesn't necessarily have to be: "Believe us." Sometimes it can be: "Don't believe anyone else."
Apply the same standard to everyone.
Because propaganda doesn't become less manipulative simply because it comes from the side we support.
A modern influence operation can work like this
Stage 1 — Create. Dozens of accounts are created.
Stage 2 — Dress them up. They receive: logos, professional biographies, apparently local identities, political slogans: “News”, “TV”, “Press” or “Monitor” names
Stage 3 — Build credibility They post ordinary material, sports, celebrity stories, memes, weather, etc.
Stage 4 — Introduce politics. Once an audience exists, political material starts appearing.
Stage 5 — Coordinate. Several accounts post the same story, photograph or video.
Stage 6 — Amplify. Larger accounts share the material.
Stage 7 — Launder. A claim originating from one source appears to come from five, ten or twenty apparently independent accounts.
Stage 8 — Disappear. When the network is exposed, accounts are deleted or suspended.
New accounts appear.
And the process begins again.
Don't make the opposite mistake
There is a danger in compiling a list like this. Calling something fake news can itself become propaganda if the evidence isn't shown.
A politically biased account isn't automatically fake. A government-funded news organisation isn't automatically false. A controversial journalist isn't automatically a disinformation agent. And a fact-checker isn't automatically correct.
The strongest approach is therefore evidence first, label second.
EUvsDisinfo maintains a searchable database of documented pro-Kremlin disinformation cases and updates it weekly. Meta also publishes investigations into coordinated inauthentic behaviour, including the networks it removes from Facebook and Instagram.
These databases are much more useful than a simple internet blacklist because they explain why an operation was identified.
The Blurs Test
Before believing something you see on social media, try this five-minute test:
STOP
S — Source
Who originally published it?
T — Trace
Can you trace the claim back to the original evidence?
O — Other sources
Are genuinely independent organisations reporting the same thing?
P — Purpose
Who benefits from you believing it?
And one final question:
Can you prove the account is what it claims to be?
If you can't, don't automatically assume it's fake. But don't automatically assume it's real either.
Known Government-linked Fake Social Media Accounts
Below is a consolidated list of the individual account names/handles that we can verify from the published investigations, including the Western/pro-Western and Israeli-linked operations.
These are accounts that researchers specifically identified as part of, or potentially connected to, inauthentic/coordinated activity.
A–Z verified account names
@Anthony67761460
@AnthonyDix45421
@ArtliffLuna11
@AshishGupt60926
@AustinHarr52986
@BrownMark53111
@brown_dana31168
@CarolynWil29309
@ChristianH2688
@chrislaz87
@DavidPaul15245
@derrickinaround
@GeraldRose77969
@GbRyh31513
@GregoryTho48702
@hardin_pat53299
@HaviBernstien
@Himansh00149505
@HunterSwan51457
@jacobs_she91213
@JamesRoger2933
@JenniferRo93215
@JeffreySum90231
@JodyAnders78949
@jones_mark41027
@JonathanHe75997
@KavanaghRonna1
@KennethTur16282
@kimcohenCA
@KimberlyBe48832
@KmberlySe16396
@LindaGray748063
@MelissaSma70032
@MichaelLew87760
@mayo_nicol11569
@Mer iWharton18
@MohiniRama47169
@MonicaPric70786
@PatrickFau2127
@PaulHarris65462
@PhylissGalvin
@ryanairmilehigh
@SarmaAjita99911
@ShaunL6969
@STate82230
@StevenVarg49190
@TiffanySin98002
@TylerReed740478
@WalkerNath99682
@WilliamVel49945
@Wright1Michael_
@roth_court73616
@offerrossman
IUVM Press
IUVM TV
IUVM Daily
IUVM Pixel
IUVM Online
BRICS4CLICKS
INN Iran National News
Kim Jong Un Parody
Lapsha Media
Mojtaba Khamenei Parody
News Now
Times of Iran News
USA ARMY NEWS
Verified4War
Vladimir Putin Commentary
WarOnFakes
Nio Thinker
Savannah Time
EvenPolitics
Teorator
Westland Sun
@Wright1Michael_
@ArtliffLuna11
@KavanaghRonna1
@ShaunL6969
@chrislaz87
@derrickinaround
@ryanairmilehigh
@HaviBernstien
@KmberlySe16396
@roth_court73616
@JenniferRo93215
@hardin_pat53299
@AshishGupt60926
@Himansh00149505
@JodyAnders78949
@JamesRoger2933
@HunterSwan51457
@mayo_nicol11569
@GeraldRose77969
@AnthonyDix45421
@Anthony67761460
@BrownMark53111
@KennethTur16282
@AustinHarr52986
@GbRyh31513
@LindaGray748063
The same standard should apply across the board: Russia, Iran, China, Israel, the US, UK, Ukraine and other actors.
A network being pro-Western doesn't make every individual post false, just as a Russian- or Iranian-linked network doesn't mean every statement it publishes is necessarily false.
The individual accounts above have largely disappeared, which is why identifying the network and behavioural characteristics is more useful than simply maintaining a static blacklist.
The bigger picture
The internet has created an extraordinary paradox. There has never been more information available to ordinary people — and there has never been a greater need to establish where that information came from.
The recent BRICS4CLICKS and Verified4War investigations demonstrate how relatively small networks can achieve enormous reach when coordinated activity intersects with algorithmic recommendation systems.
Together, the networks generated more than one billion views during the period studied by ISD.
And that is probably the most important lesson. The question isn't simply:
“Is this story true?”
It is also:
“Who created it, who amplified it, and why did it reach me?”
That is where investigating social-media misinformation becomes considerably more interesting. The real story isn't simply finding the fake account. It's following the network behind it.
Editorial note
This article deliberately does not describe every organisation or account mentioned as “fake news” in the absolute sense. Where researchers have identified coordinated inauthentic behaviour, deceptive identities, information operations or documented disinformation, that specific finding is stated. Some accounts have subsequently been removed, renamed or replaced.
This distinction is essential to help readers investigate information rather than simply give them another political blacklist.
Sources: EUvsDisinfo, Meta, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Graphika and OpenAI.
Read more on:
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